“Every king has a sanctuary, and the sanctuary of Allah is what He has prohibited.”
[dropcap size=big]P[/dropcap]eople sometimes jokingly ask, why is it that driving requires a license, but you can have children without a license or any kind of certification? It is usually a lighthearted remark, but, when you think about it, this is a legitimate question. If driving or teaching at a school, practicing medicine or law, or even being a plumber requires certification, then what about something that is far more sensitive, far more significant like having children and raising them?
After all, children are our future, and the state of our society as a whole depends on how children are brought up — their morals, their sense of responsibility, their character, and so on. As the National Criminal Justice Reference Service and other extensive research studies report, children who grow up without proper parental influence are far more likely to become involved in drugs and crime, to face unemployment, not to complete their education, to fail to become productive members of society and upright human beings. This, then, has a toll on all of us, on all members of society.
Given these high stakes, one has to wonder how any civilized society could allow its people to have children without having some kind of regulation to ensure that all children are born to competent parents, parents invested in their children’s well being and future. Isn’t it a child’s right to have a stable household and parents capable of properly raising him? Isn’t it our right as members of society to make sure incompetent, irresponsible people in our midst are not having children that they will neglect, children who will be more likely to become burdens on society and, hence, each and every one of us?
The “M” Word
Islam, of course, does require just such a license — a nikah, i.e., the marriage contract. Properly done, according to Prophetic guidance, a nikah ensures that a couple is in the best position to raise a family, with the full support of the extended family and the community at large. One of the biggest wisdoms of the nikah, as all classical scholars agreed, is upholding the rights of children and, thereby, upholding the rights of society at large.
It should go without saying that there are Muslim marriages that fail and Muslim married couples who will not make for good parents despite having had a nikah, etc. But my claim is not that every married Muslim couple will provide better conditions for raising children than every single parent household. Rather, the claim is that, overall, we significantly increase the chances of providing better conditions for raising children in the context of a marriage between biological parents than in the context of unwed parents or single-parent households. This is a claim supported by empirical data, as cited throughout this post. It is also supported by rational reflection, and ratified by the practice of human societies throughout the ages.
Furthermore, beyond marriage as practiced by non-Muslims, what distinguishes Muslim marriage is that the different Islamic legal requirements, conditions, and supererogatory elements of the nikah — as practiced by the early Muslim community and generations of Muslims thereafter — further enhance the chances of successfully raising children and contributing to the flourishing of a community and society writ large. Requiring the mahr, for example, or that the bride have a wali (according to the majority opinion), etc., all practically and, therefore, rationally contribute to the chances of success of the marriage and its ability to produce children who will positively impact the world. Tying each of these Islamic legal requirements to that overall benefit requires a detailed and extended analysis beyond the scope of this post. (I will leave it as an exercise for the reader.) But my broader argument does not hinge on that analysis. For the time being, we can proceed with the less contentious claim that promoting marriage — and preventing extramarital sex which directly undermines it — positively correlates with a whole host of public benefits.
(Of course, besides promoting public benefits, there are countless other wisdoms and rationales for prohibiting zina, i.e., premarital and extramarital sexual relationships. Classical scholars, for example, often mention the rights of men to know their progeny, the rights of women to be supported by their children’s fathers, the rights of larger kinship bonds, the rights of children in knowing their own lineage, preserving honor more generally, etc. But, for the sake of argument, let’s focus on the social impact of single parenthood and unwanted pregnancies for now, since this is the kind of reasoning that resonates in the modern liberal secular discourse that presumably cares so much for human rights, autonomy, and freedom.)
Let Me be Clear…
My purpose here is not to stigmatize single mothers or fathers or their children. Obviously there are many reasons why single parent households arise: a married couple gets divorced, a parent dies, etc. Nor is my purpose to necessarily stigmatize those individuals who engage in premarital sex in this day and age. The unfortunate reality is that most people today, especially in the West, are ignorant of the dangers and ugliness inherent in zina. Zina itself is no longer taboo, and so genuinely ignorant people should not be judged.
Rather, my purpose is to reacquaint people with the claim that, for very good reasons that have nothing to do with one’s personal religious beliefs, extramarital relations are an objective evil. By doing this, I aim specifically to counter the widespread attack on Islamic sexual ethics by liberal secular ideologues who strive to portray Islam as outmoded or even inhumane. I believe that this attack needs to be countered with clear arguments and evidence, and talking about the enormous negative societal effects of extramarital sex is a good starting point.
Also by way of disclaimer, I should say that I am aware that arguing on the basis of “society” and the overall “public good” is anachronistic from the perspective of traditional Islam. But, again, I am deliberately (yet, cautiously) using this language in order to be conversant with modern normative discourse, which often takes the form of sociological analysis.
I am also sensitive to the characterization of traditional religions as prioritizing communal benefit and modern liberalism, by contrast, putting a premium on individual autonomy. Based on this, it may seem that my appeals to public good and societal cohesion are just another way of saying that individuals must sacrifice their sexual autonomy for the sake of the overall good. In actuality, I find this supposed tension between communal well being and individualistic autonomy incoherent, since, from one perspective, what benefits people individually will, in the collective, benefit people in the aggregate and vice versa. In this light, then, abstinence is not merely a sacrifice for the sake of the collective good, but a sacrifice that contributes to the good of people in the aggregate and, thereby, the good of people on the individual level. We will also see it work the other way, viz., as contributing to the good of people on the individual level and that, in the aggregate of millions of lives, contributing to the good of people collectively. In this way, we can bypass the charge of anachronism when employing inexorably modern concepts like “society,” “demographic indicators,” “population,” etc.
Critics of Islamic Sexual Ethics
As it turns out, Islamic sexual ethics have been the target of unrelenting criticism from modernists and liberals for decades, critics who argue that Islamic law stifles the sexual freedom and autonomy of individuals by prohibiting premarital sex. If two people love each other, they argue, why can’t they consummate that love? Who is harmed by such a consensual relationship? Clearly, there are no victims, so Islamic sexual prohibitions must only be based on prudery and outmoded sexual repression. That is why, the argument continues, we must spurn these prohibitions in favor of freedom and the human right to sexual self-determination.
But this argument against Islamic law is woefully inadequate. To the contrary, it can be argued that prohibiting zina clearly protects people’s freedom and autonomy and promotes human rights. How? Because such prohibition effectively curbs the number of children being born to single mothers and couples who are not in a position to take adequate care of them. This in turn benefits the interests of children and hence, the interests of society at large. If crime rates go up, for example, because one generation ago, a large percentage of children were born out of wedlock, then those higher crime rates have a direct impact on my personal quality of life. If I have to pay higher taxes because the police force has to be beefed up, again, that is an imposition on my personal autonomy and freedom, as my personal wealth is siphoned off by government agencies and social programs that are taking care of children born of the ill-advised decisions of irresponsible yet sexually active individuals.
There is all manner of sociological evidence to support this line of reasoning. As one example, consider the hugely popular, bestselling book Freakonomics. In it, the authors, Levitt and Dubner, present research that correlates the legalization of abortion in America and other countries with subsequent drops in crime rates in those countries. They explain this correlation by arguing that legalizing abortion made it easier for women to terminate unwanted pregnancies. This, in turn, meant that fewer unwanted children were born and, hence, that fewer children grew up in detrimental environments and households that would make them prone to a life of crime.
Pro-abortion advocates often use this sociological data on crime rates to argue — much to the chagrin of their conservative, pro-life interlocutors — that abortion greatly benefits society as a whole. But the obvious conclusion that goes unnoticed, however, is that these same benefits of abortion could equally be achieved simply by preventing premarital sex. The exact same logic applies — if fewer people are having sex outside of marriage, there are fewer children being born to mothers who are not in a position to provide an upbringing that will prevent those children from eventually falling into illegal and destructive behavior, and so on.
Another way to look at it is that abortion is simply one of many ways to control reproduction. Contraception is another avenue. Forced sterilization is yet another. And, of course, sexual norms against zina, as found in Islamic law, are just another way to control how people in society reproduce (primarily from the perspective of quality and not necessarily quantity). Research shows that, on a societal level, crime rates, education levels, unemployment, drug use, and future family income, all can be significantly influenced by controlling reproduction via access to abortion and contraception. Obviously, those same benefits would, mutatis mutandis, obtain by prohibiting premarital sex.
The Scarlet Letter
And what about adultery? The concept of zina is inclusive of both premarital sex and adultery. Obviously, engaging in infidelity very often leads to divorce, i.e., creating those single-parent households that are correlated with numerous societal ills. In that way, adultery indirectly contributes to those ills in much the same way premarital sex does. Even if infidelity does not lead to divorce, however, there is empirical data to suggest that the instability in family life caused by unfaithful parents can negatively impact children and, therefore, correlate with those societal ills as well.
All that being said, most people today intuitively understand that cheating on one’s spouse is wrong. Even a large proportion of individuals actively engaged in adultery admit that it is immoral and feel remorse and shame. In other words, the social taboo against adultery is still alive, unlike that of premarital sex. In the language of Islam, people today have not lost touch with that part of the fitra that rails against this particular fahisha. Given that society’s moral intuitions about adultery are still sound in this way, the need for Muslims to defend Islamic law’s prohibition of extramarital affairs is not as pressing as it is for fornication (and liwat, or sodomy).
That being said, there have been recent efforts in Western society to normalize adultery and “swinging,” as “cheating websites” are promoted by national advertising campaigns, shamelessly encouraging married individuals to find a lover (or two…) on the side. If the day comes when even adultery is seen as a harmless, victimless act, then Islamic law, which imposes capital punishment for convicted adulterers, will be in need of further defense by Muslim commentators.
The Modern World — A World of Orphans
Even without the empirical data, logically, all this makes perfect sense. It is reasoning you can understand and accept whether you are Muslim or not. And we can see this logic spelled out in the writings of Muslim jurists through the centuries as well as in the Quran itself. For example, reflect on how much emphasis Allah puts on taking care of orphans in the Quran. The orphan is one who is deprived of the great benefits that children with parents are blessed with. Logically, if orphans are considered so destitute due to not having parents, that implies that parents (are supposed to) provide an enormous, incalculable boon to children by way of nurturing them, educating them, raising them with important values, etc.
But in the modern world, a significant proportion of children are orphans for all intents and purposes because, even though they have living parents, those parents do not want them or their fathers or mothers do not feel obligated to stick around for them, or a single parent has to work full-time forcing the child to be perpetually in the care of strangers and the broken public school system, and so on. According to the CDC, over 40% of children born today in the US are born to single mothers.
The incomparable benefit that parents are supposed to be for their children is simply not there in our modern world. We live in a world of de facto orphans, children with absentee parents who end up being raised by a cold, machine-like state system that processes human beings like so much cattle. Is it any surprise that teens and adults nowadays feel no obligations or affinity towards their parents, and the Islamic injunction to respect and care for one’s parents rings hollow in the minds of many? Is it any surprise to see some of the alarming societal trends — the increase in substance abuse, the dismantling of families, the rise of extreme antisocial behavior including mass shootings — burgeoning all around us? All these phenomena are connected such that messing with something seemingly small and insignificant, like undoing the social taboo against extramarital sex, ultimately causes the entire edifice to collapse.
The Anticlimactic Prophylactic Tactic
Now, the inevitable counter argument to all this is, what about contraception? Hasn’t contraception made traditional norms against premarital sex obsolete?
Well, to begin with, let’s not forget that reducing social problems like crime, drug addiction, unemployment, etc., is only one of the many benefits of refraining from premarital sex. For the purposes of this post, I focus on that particular benefit because it aligns nicely with liberal secular reasoning. The only moral principle that liberal secular reasoning endorses is the Harm Principle, roughly defined as the idea that an act is only considered immoral if it causes harm. In fact, the Harm Principle is often used to argue against Islamic sexual ethics because premarital sex, so long as it is consensual and not incestual, etc., causes no harm to anyone, or so it is argued. But, as we have seen, there is clearly great harm to any potential children and to society at large, since it is everyone in society that has to deal with the eventual impact of premarital sex on crime, unemployment, and all the other societal ills correlated with unwanted pregnancies and single-parent homes.
Appealing to contraception in response to this, then, is meant to undercut our reasoning. If a person can have premarital sex and the possibility of conception is foreclosed, then where is the harm, really?
The answer to this is simple. First of all, who decided that the Harm Principle is the be-all, end-all of morality? If we give a cursory glance at the complex, intricate, and expansive rules, attitudes, injunctions, and nuances that constitute the moral and legal thought of even the most secular of nations and their peoples, we see that there is much that cannot be reduced to the directive: do no harm. Many notable ethical, political, and legal philosophers have concluded as much in evaluating the Harm Principle itself.
But even if, for the sake of argument, we were to accept the Harm Principle as our sole basis for judging sexual relationships as immoral, we would still be able to arrive at — or at least approximate — the norms of Islamic law. This is because “harm” itself is a very general term that can encompass any number of things. As it turns out, harm is a rather subjective concept, and even beyond personal subjectivity, the notion of harm can be very culturally specific in that what one culture sees as harmful, another finds innocuous, and vice versa.
But even if, for the sake of argument, we limit ourselves to modern Western culture, we can still identify a number of clear harms associated with so-called “sexual freedom.” In her book, A Return to Modesty, Wendy Shalit reviews numerous studies showing the debilitating repercussions upon individuals’ psyches, particularly those of young women. She cites bulwark feminists admitting that, “Girls today are much more oppressed [than they were prior to the sexual revolution]. They are coming of age in a more dangerous, sexualized and media-saturated culture.” Another scientific study she cites discovers that sexually active unmarried teenage girls are three times as likely to report that they are depressed. But depression is only part of it — eating disorders, low sense of self-worth, higher suicide rates and various psychological disorders are all positively correlated with premarital sexual activity, especially for females.
On a more conceptual level, Shalit wonders how casual sex, dating, and hooking up could ever be considered good for women. As many world religions and past cultures recognized, to limit men’s access to sex is prime leverage and a unique source of power for women. Why would modern “liberated” women relinquish that power so cheaply by having sex with a man who has shown minimal to no commitment to her (or to any potential children)? Not surprisingly, with the rise of casual sex, marriage rates have plummeted, as men simply see no reason to get married. And the idea that women want sex the same way men do and that they respond to casual sexual encounters in the same way men do has been thoroughly debunked by scientific research that shows how, even neurologically, women are especially harmed by “no strings” sex.
So, on multiple levels, we see that a reasonable case can be made for the Islamic prohibition of zina. And all the while, we have been assuming that access to contraception is effective at reducing unwanted pregnancies. But, in fact, this is a faulty assumption because, if the existence of contraception coupled with widespread sex education were enough to prevent unwanted pregnancies, why has single parenthood continued to rise decade after decade for the past 50 years, such that single-parent households have tripled since the 1960s? Is it that three times as many people in the present day want to raise a child alone and face the monumental financial and emotional burden that that task involves? Not likely.
And finally, I began this post with an analogy about different kinds of certifications and licenses. When you look at airplanes, they have had autopilot for decades — that does not mean pilots do not need to be certified before being able to safely fly a commercial jet! Similarly, the existence of contraception does not annul the need for a person to be licensed (via marriage) in order to safely engage in sex. In both cases, multiple lives are at stake, and, naturally, the greater the stakes, the greater the need for regulation.
The Rationale of the Hudud
Before starting let me just make the disclaimer that my intention here is not to make a political or juristic argument in support of implementing hudud in any present country or community. Furthermore, my intention is not to justify or defend the implementation of hudud as it is practiced in various parts of the Muslim world today. The complex questions of if and how hudud are applicable and operationalizable in a modern nation state generally or in a particular country specifically are best left to qualified legal scholars, theologians, and policy makers.
Separate from the practical considerations of fiqh and siyasa, my concern is purely with the moral dimension of hudud, specifically as it was practiced historically by the Prophet and his Companions. The historical record is clear that the Prophet and his Companions enforced hadd punishments for sexual misconduct: stoning and lashing. Many modern people, whether Muslim or not, are appalled by this and take this as evidence that Muhammad ibn Abdullah was not the Messenger of God and that Islam is not a religion of peace but rather one of barbarity. Given this, it is necessary for Muslims to address what is ultimately a moral concern on hudud. And as it is a moral concern, the best way to address it is not with the hackneyed apologetics about hudud being inapplicable without a legitimate caliphate, etc., but with moral reasoning and argumentation completely separate from the dicey conversation about how different, often superficially Muslim regimes enact hudud within their messy political contexts in the modern world.
The difficulty people today have with the notion of hadd for zina can be broken up into three distinct moral questions.
1. Is premarital and extramarital sex immoral?
2. If so, should that immorality be a matter of criminal justice, i.e., subject to prosecution and penalty by authorities?
3. If so, what is appropriate punishment?
Let’s address these questions in order.
As for the immorality of zina, this is what I have made a case for throughout this post, using reasoning that even proponents of liberal secularism can countenance, if not outright accept.
As for question two, i.e., whether zina should be a matter for policing and the courts, we should acknowledge that premarital sex is very much a public concern. If we accept the immorality of zina, as per question one, and we recognize that zina is certainly not a victimless crime and can have devastating public consequences when practiced on a large scale, then why shouldn’t enforcement and judicial process be on the table? In fact, it would be irrational for us to recognize all the harms associated with zina and then not think that some form of public sanction should be involved to deter destructive behavior, and so on. And, of course, Islamic law has detailed procedures that clarify what this enforcement and judicial process entail, e.g., court structure, evidentiary standards, how to deal with false accusers, sentencing, etc.
Once we agree that zina is immoral and ought to be criminalized, the question remains of what punishment is most in accord with justice. Now, it is helpful to recognize that the question of how criminals should be punished is one that Western ethical and legal philosophers have not come to any consensus on. Different theories speculate as to whether enforcing justice should be punitive, retributive, preventative, expiatory, reformative, etc. Even the question of capital punishment itself is hotly debated to this day.
So, if we have already begun to make a case for why zina ought to be publicly regulated, as per question two, and if all that remains is the question of what form that regulation should take, then a number of options present themselves. Different cultures historically have had various unique methods to punish those who violate norms and break taboos. If we limit ourselves to Western culture and recent history, incarceration is the most widely used punishment (or “rehabilitation”). Recently, however, Peter Moskos, an associate professor at John Jay College of Criminal Justice has written a very persuasive book defending the practice of flogging. In Defense of Flogging deserves to be read in full, but Moskos summarizes the main arguments here. He argues that, while many today believe that corporal punishments such as lashing are “cruel and unusual,” in actuality, the prison system is far more brutal, excessive, and even tortuous. He asks readers whether, given the choice between five years in prison and ten lashes, which would they choose? By asking us this, Moskos forces us to question whether lashing really is as severe as we might first suppose. Overall, Moskos convincingly undermines the conventional view of lashing, and his book has been recognized a “Favorite Book of the Year” by Mother Jones and earned Moskos recognition as one of Atlantic Magazine’s “Brave Thinkers of 2011.”
All in all, we can provide reasoned justification and explanation for hudud when it comes to all three questions. While hudud in response to zina may at first have seemed completely alien and inhumane, upon further reflection it is rendered at least minimally reasonable by way of these considerations. And that was the point of this entire exercise — we wanted to articulate a rationale for the hudud that a modern person could see as reasoned and within the bounds of moral possibility, even if ultimately that person cannot endorse Islamic law himself. In Western universities, for example, a student will study many varieties of legal and moral theories, and while that student may not feel compelled to accept the theories his professors teach him, the student has to admit that those theories are at least worthy of study and that reasonable people can agree to disagree on the applicability and acceptability of them. This is one way Muslims who do endorse Islamic law can speak to their interlocutors about things like hudud without worrying about being taken for irrational, barbaric, mindless, religious zealots. Reasonable people can disagree.
What we have seen is that, even if one is not religious per se, the rational merits of prohibiting premarital sex and adultery are more than evident. And all the sociological evidence supports this.
To summarize, premarital sex is not a victimless crime, as many of us have been led to believe. It is a major crime that most modern nations have allowed to run rampant despite the vast human toll. This in turn affects the crime rate, it affects the percentage of the population that requires government assistance through welfare, unemployment benefits, etc. — in effect, it makes people far more dependent on the state, thus increasing state power exponentially, as tax collectors draw increasing amounts of wealth from the population to foot the bill for these social assistance programs. It is no wonder that modern nation states have shown no interest in upholding the sexual ethics that human societies have depended on for thousands of years.
In sum, we can make a compelling case for why Islamic sexual ethics are rationally and ethically viable compared to the liberal secular alternative. This is not to say that the wisdom (hikma) of avoiding zina can be reduced to the reasoning explicated here or that the applicability of Islamic sexual ethics in an individual’s life depends on rationally working out such arguments. Rather, we want to speak against the notion, entrenched in modern society, that religious sexual norms are simply irrational, primitive taboos. In actuality, we believe that our religion is the best guarantor of human interests broadly and, epistemologically, this fact is accessible to the rational mind upon reflection. At the very least, even if someone does not ultimately agree with all this reasoning, he can admit that it is reasonable. And that is enough to characterize Islam’s sexual ethics concerning zina as rational and not simply prudish, close-minded, backwards, cruel, and all the other cheap adjectives used to denigrate Islamic law vis-a-vis modernity, liberal secularism, etc.
Ultimately, the significance of talking about the rationality of Islamic sexual ethics is that we, as Muslims, can be confident that Islamic norms can be defended specifically from the perspective and in the language of the dominant moral philosophy of our times, i.e., liberal secularism. Unfortunately, many Muslims are not aware of these kinds of arguments and, therefore, take a fideistic attitude towards much of Islamic law, i.e., they accept Islamic norms on faith and little else, implicitly endorsing the modernistic view that these norms are pure “religious taboos” with little rhyme or reason to recommend them to a thinking mind. Against this, various arguments such as the above can be deployed to rationally satisfy Muslims and non-Muslims alike who may not be intellectually convinced of the moral and rational viability of a 1400 year-old religion. Once the mere viability and reasonability of Islam and Islamic law is accepted, then a more fruitful debate can take place regarding the superiority of Islam as an ethical, societal, spiritual system and way of life — guidance for mankind from the Lord of all that exists.
Obituary of (Mawlana) Yusuf Sulayman Motala (1366/1946 – 1441/2019)
Monday, September 9, turned out to be a day of profound anguish and sorrow for many around the world. In the early morning hours, news of the death of Mawlana* Yusuf Sulayman Motala, fondly known as “Hazrat” (his eminence) to those who were acquainted with him, spread. He had passed away on Sunday at 8:20 pm EST in Toronto, after suffering a heart attack two weeks earlier.
A master of hadith and Qur’an. A sufi, spiritual guide and teacher to thousands. A pioneer in the establishment of a religious education system. His death reverberated through hearts and across oceans. We are all mourning the loss of a luminary who guided us through increasingly difficult times.
Monday, September 9, turned out to be a day of profound anguish and sorrow for many around the world. In the early morning hours, news of the death of Mawlana* Yusuf Sulayman Motala, fondly known as “Hazrat” (his eminence) to those who were acquainted with him, spread. He had passed away on Sunday at 8:20 pm EST in Toronto, after suffering a heart attack two weeks earlier. (May the Almighty envelope him in His mercy)
His journey in this world had begun more than 70 years ago in the small village of Nani Naroli in Gujarat, India, where he was born on November 25, 1946 (1 Muharram 1366) into a family known for their piety.
His early studies were largely completed at Jami’a Husayniyya, one of the early seminaries of Gujarat, after which he travelled to Mazahir Ulum, the second oldest seminary of the Indian Sub-Continent, in Saharanpur, India, to complete his ‘alimiyya studies. What drew him to this seminary was the presence of one of the most influential and well-known contemporary spiritual guides, Mawlana Muhammad Zakariyya Kandhlawi (d. 1402/1982), better known as “Hazrat Shaykh.” He had seen Mawlana Zakariyya only briefly at a train stop, but it was enough for him to understand the magnitude of his presence.
Mawlana Yusuf remained in Saharanpur for two years. Despite being younger than many of the other students of Shaykh Zakariya, the shaykh took a great liking to him. Shaykh Zakariya showered him with great attention and even deferred his retirement from teaching Sahih al-Bukhari so that Mawlana Yusuf could study it under his instruction. While in Saharanpur, Mawlana Yusuf also studied under a number of other great scholars, such as Mawlana Muhammad ‘Aqil (author of Al-Durr al-Mandud, an Urdu commentary of Sunan Abi Dawud and current head lecturer of Hadith at the same seminary), Shaykh Yunus Jownpuri (d. 1438/2017) the previous head lecturer of Hadith there), Mawlana As‘adullah Rampuri (d. 1399/1979) and Mufti Muzaffar Husayn (d. 1424/2003).
Upon completion of his studies, Mawlana Yusuf’s marriage was arranged to marry a young woman from the Limbada family that had migrated to the United Kingdom from Gujarat. In 1968, he relocated to the UK and accepted the position of imam at Masjid Zakariya, in Bolton. Although he longed to be in the company of his shaykh, he had explicit instructions to remain in the UK and focus his efforts on establishing a seminary for memorization of Qur’an and teaching of the ‘alimiyya program. The vision being set in motion was to train a generation of Muslims scholars that would educate and guide the growing Muslim community.
Establishing the first Muslim seminary, in the absence of any precedent, was a daunting task. The lack of support from the Muslim community, the lack of integration into the wider British community, and the lack of funds made it seem an impossible endeavour. And yet, Mawlana Yusuf never wavered in his commitment and diligently worked to make the dream of his teacher a reality. In 1973 he purchased the derelict Aitken Sanatorium in the village of Holcombe, near Bury, Lancashire. What had once been a hospice for people suffering from tuberculosis, would become one of the first fully-fledged higher-education Islamic institutes outside of the Indian-Subcontinent teaching the adapted-Nizami syllabus.
The years of struggle by Maulana Yusuf to fulfil this vision paid off handsomely. Today, after four decades, Darul Uloom Al Arabiyya Al Islamiyya, along with its several sister institutes, also founded by Mawlana Yusuf, such as the Jamiatul Imam Muhammad Zakariya seminary in Bradford for girls, have produced well over 2,000 British born (and other international students) male and female ‘alimiyya graduates – many of whom are working as scholars and serving communities across the UK, France, Belgium, Holland, Portugal, the US, Canada, Barbados, Trinidad, Panama, Saudi Arabia, India and New Zealand. Besides these graduates, a countless number of individuals have memorized the Qur’an at these institutes. Moreover, many of the graduates of the Darul Uloom and its sister institutes have set up their own institutes, such as Jamiatul Ilm Wal Huda in Blackburn, Islamic Dawah Academy in Leicester, Jami’ah al-Kawthar in Lancaster, UK, and Darul Uloom Palmela in Portugal, to just mention a few of the larger ones. Within his lifetime, Mawlana Yusuf saw first-hand the fruit of his labours – witnessing his grand students (graduates from his students’ institutes) providing religious instruction and services to communities around the world in their local languages. What started as a relationship of love between a student and teacher, manifested into the transmission of knowledge across continents. In some countries, such as the UK and Portugal, one would be hard-pressed to find a Muslim who had not directly or indirectly benefited from him.
Mawlana Yusuf was a man with deep insights into the needs of Western contemporary society, one that was very different from the one he had grown up and trained in. With a view to contributing to mainstream society, Mawlana Yusuf encouraged his graduates to enter into further education both in post-graduate Islamic courses and western academia, and to diversify their fields of learning through courses at mainstream UK universities. As a result, many ‘alimiyya graduates of his institutes are trained in law, mainstream medicine, natural medicine and homeopathy, mental health, child protection, finance, IT, education, chaplaincy, psychology, philosophy, pharmacy, physics, journalism, engineering, architecture, calligraphy, typography, graphic design, optometry, social services, public health, even British Sign Language. His students also include several who have completed PhDs and lecture at universities. His vision was to train British-born (or other) Muslim scholars who would be well versed in contemporary thought and discipline along with their advanced Islamic learning, equipping them to better contribute to society.
Despite his commitment to the establishment of a public good, the shaykh was an immensely private person and avoided seeking accolade or attention. For many decades he refused invitations to attend conferences or talks around the country, choosing to focus on his students and his family, teaching the academic syllabus and infusing the hearts of many aspirants with the love of Allah through regular gatherings of remembrance (dhikr) and spiritual retreats (i’tikaf) in the way of his shaykh’s Chishti Sufi order.
During my entire stay with him at Darul Uloom (1985–1997), I can say with honesty that I did not come across a single student who spoke ill of him. He commanded such awe and respect that people would find it difficult to speak with him casually. And yet, for those who had the opportunity to converse with him, knew that he was the most compassionate, humble, and loving individual.
He was full of affection for his students and colleagues and had immense concern for the Muslim Ummah, especially in the West. He possessed unparalleled forbearance and self-composure. When he taught or gave a talk, he spoke in a subdued and measured tone, as though he was weighing every word, knowing the import it carried. He would sit, barely moving and without shifting his posture. Even after a surgical procedure for piles, he sat gracefully teaching us Sahih al-Bukhari. Despite the obvious pain, he never made an unpleasant expression or winced from the pain.
Anyone who has listened to his talks or read his books can bear testimony to two things: his immense love for the Messenger of Allah and his love for Shaykh Mawlana Muhammad Zakariya Kandhlawi (may Allah have mercy on him). It is probably hard to find a talk in which he did not speak of the two. His shaykh was no doubt his link to the Messenger of Allah (Allah bless him and give him peace) in both his hadith and spiritual transmissions.
Over the last decade, he had retired from most of his teaching commitments (except Sahih al-Bukhari) and had reduced meeting with people other than his weekly dhikr gatherings. His time was spent with his family and young children and writing books. His written legacy comprises over 20 titles, mostly in Urdu but also a partial tafsir of the Qur’an in classical Arabic.
After the news of his heart attack on Sunday, August 25, and the subsequent effects to his brain, his well-wishers around the world completed hundreds of recitals of the Qur’an, several readings of the entire Sahih al-Bukhari, thousands of litanies and wirds of the formula of faith (kalima tayyiba), and gave charity in his name. However, Allah Most High willed otherwise and intended for him to depart this lowly abode to begin his journey to the next. He passed away two weeks later and reports state that approximately 4,000 people attended his funeral. Had his funeral been in the UK, the number of attendees would have multiplied several folds. But he had always shied away from large crowds and gatherings and maybe this was Allah Most High’s gift to him after his death. He was 75 (in Hijra years, and 72 in Gregorian) at the time of his death and leaves behind eight children and several grandchildren.
Mawlana Yusuf educated, inspired and nourished the minds and hearts of countless across the UK and beyond. May Allah Almighty bless him with the loftiest of abodes in the Gardens of Firdaws in the company of Allah’s beloved Messenger (Allah bless him and give him peace) and grant all his family, students, and cherishers around the world beautiful patience.
Dr Mufti Abdur-Rahman Mangera
Whitethread Institute, London
(A fortunate graduate of Darul Uloom Bury, 1996–97)
Shaykh Hamza Yusuf And The Question of Rebellion In The Islamic Tradition
In recent years, Shaykh Hamza Yusuf, a notable Islamic scholar from North America, has gained global prominence by supporting efforts by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to deal with the fallout of the Arab revolutions. The UAE is a Middle Eastern autocracy that has been the chief strategist behind quelling the Arab revolutionary aspiration for accountable government in the region. Shaykh Hamza views himself as helping prevent the region from falling into chaos by supporting one of its influential autocratic states. However, more recently, he has become embroiled in another controversy because of comments he made regarding the Syrian revolution in 2016 that surfaced online earlier this week and for which he has since apologised. I will not discuss these comments directly in this article, but the present piece does have a bearing on the issue of revolution as it addresses the question of how Islamic scholars have traditionally responded to tyranny. Thus, in what follows, I somewhat narrowly focus on another recent recording of Shaykh Hamza that has been published by a third party in the past couple of weeks entitled: “Hamza Yusuf’s response to the criticism for working with Trump administration”. While it was published online at the end of August 2019, the short clip may, in fact, predate the Trump controversy, as it only addresses the more general charge that Shaykh Hamza is supportive of tyrannical governments.
Thus, despite its title, the primary focus of the recording is what the Islamic tradition purportedly says about the duty of Muslims to render virtually unconditional obedience to even the most tyrannical of rulers. In what follows, I argue that Shaykh Hamza’s contention that the Islamic tradition has uniformly called for rendering obedience to tyrannical rule—a contention that he has been repeating for many years—is inaccurate. Indeed, it is so demonstrably inaccurate that one wonders how a scholar as learned as Shaykh Hamza can portray it as the mainstream interpretation of the Islamic tradition rather than as representing a particularly selective reading of fourteen hundred years of scholarship. Rather than rest on this claim, I will attempt to demonstrate this in what follows. (Note: this article was sent to Shaykh Hamza for comment at the beginning of this month, but he has not replied in time for publication.)
Opposing all government vs opposing a government
Shaykh Hamza argues that “the Islamic tradition” demands that one render virtually absolute obedience to one’s rulers. He bases this assertion on a number of grounds, each of which I will address in turn. Firstly, he argues that Islam requires government, because the opposite of having a government would be a state of chaos. This is, however, to mischaracterise the arguments of the majority of mainstream scholars in Islamic history down to the present who, following explicit Qur’anic and Prophetic teachings, opposed supporting tyrannical rulers. None of these scholars ever advocated the removal of government altogether. They only opposed tyranny. For some reason that is difficult to account for, Shaykh Hamza does not, in addressing the arguments of his interlocutors, make the straightforward distinction between opposing tyranny, and opposing the existence of any government at all.
A complex tradition
Rather than support these tyrannical governments, the Islamic tradition provides a variety of responses to how one should oppose such governments, ranging from the more quietist—opposing them only in one’s heart—to the more activist—opposing them through armed rebellion. The majority of later scholars, including masters such as al-Ghazzali (d. 505/1111), Ibn Rajab al-Hanbali (d. 795/1393), and Ibn Hajar al-‘Asqalani (d. 852/1449) appear to have fallen somewhere between these two poles, advocating rebellion only in limited circumstances, and mostly advising a vocally critical posture towards tyranny. Of course, some early scholars, such as the sanctified member of the Prophetic Household, Sayyiduna Husayn (d. 61/680) had engaged in armed opposition to the tyranny of the Umayyads resulting in his martyrdom. Similarly, the Companion ‘Abdullah b. Zubayr (d. 73/692), grandson of Abu Bakr (d. 13/634), and son of al-Zubayr b. al-‘Awwam (d. 36/656), two of the Ten Companions Promised Paradise, had established a Caliphate based in Makkah that militarily tried to unseat the Umayyad Caliphal counter-claimant.
However, the model of outright military rebellion adopted by these illustrious scholars was generally relinquished in later centuries in favour of other forms of resisting tyranny. This notwithstanding, I will try to show that the principle of vocally resisting tyranny has always remained at the heart of the Islamic tradition contrary to the contentions of Shaykh Hamza. Indeed, I argue that the suggestion that Shaykh Hamza’s work with the UAE, an especially oppressive regime in the Arab world, is somehow backed by the Islamic tradition can only be read as a mischaracterisation of this tradition. He only explicitly cites two scholars from Islamic history to support his contention, namely Shaykhs Ahmad Zarruq (d. 899/1493) and Abu Bakr al-Turtushi (d. 520/1126), both of whom were notable Maliki scholars from the Islamic West. Two scholars of the same legal school, from roughly the same relatively peripheral geographic region, living roughly four hundred years apart, cannot fairly be used to represent the swathe of Islamic views to be found over fourteen hundred years in lands as far-flung as India to the east, Russia to the north, and southern Africa to the south.
What does the tradition actually say?
Let me briefly illustrate the diversity of opinion on this issue within the Islamic tradition by citing several more prominent and more influential figures from the same tradition alongside their very different stances on the issue of how one ought to respond to tyrannical rulers. Most of the Four Imams are in fact reported to have supported rebellion (khuruj) which is, by definition, armed. A good summary of their positions is found in the excellent study in Arabic by Shaykh ‘Abdullah al-Dumayji, who is himself opposed to rebellion, but who notes that outright rebellion against tyrannical rule was in fact encouraged by Abu Hanifa (d. 150/767) and Malik (d. 179/795), and is narrated as one of the legal positions adopted by al-Shafi‘i (d. 204/820) and Ahmad b. Hanbal (d. 241/855). As these scholars’ legal ideas developed and matured into schools of thought, many later adherents also maintained similar positions to those attributed to the founders of these schools. To avoid suggesting that armed rebellion against tyrants was the dominant position of the later Islamic tradition, let me preface this section with a note from Holberg Prize-winning Islamic historian, Michael Cook, who notes in his magisterial study of the doctrine of commanding right and forbidding wrong that “in the face of the delinquency of the ruler, there is a clear mainstream position [in the Islamic tradition]: rebuke is endorsed while [armed] rebellion is rejected.”
But there were also clearly plenty of outliers, or more qualified endorsements of rebellion against tyrants, as well as the frequent disavowal of the obligation to render them any obedience. Thus for the Malikis, one can find Qadi Abu Bakr b. al-‘Arabi (d. 543/1148) who asserts that advocating rebellion against tyrants is the main position of the madhhab; similarly among later Hanafis, one finds Qadi Abu Bakr al-Jassas (d. 370/981); for the Hanbalis, one may cite the positions of the prolific scholars Imam Ibn ‘Aqil (d. 513/1119), Ibn al-Jawzi (d. 597/1201), and in a more qualified sense, Ibn Rajab al-Hanbali. Among later Shafi‘is, I have found less explicit discussions of rebellion in my limited search, but a prominent Shafi‘i like the influential exegete and theologian al-Fakhr al-Razi (d. 606/1210) makes explicit, contrary to Shaykh Hamza’s claims, that not only is obeying rulers not an obligation, in fact “most of the time it is prohibited, since they command to nothing but tyranny.” This is similar in ways to the stance of other great Shafi‘is such as al-hafiz Ibn Hajar al-‘Asqalani who notes concerning tyrannical rulers (umara’ al-jawr) that the ulama state that “if it is possible to depose them without fitna and oppression, it is an obligation to do so. Otherwise, it is obligatory to be patient.” It is worth noting that the normative influence of such a statement cited by Ibn Hajar transcends the Shafi‘i school given that it is made in his influential commentary on Sahih al-Bukhari. Once again, contrary to the assertions of Shaykh Hamza, there is nothing to suggest that any of the illustrious scholars who supported rebellion against tyrannical rulers was advocating the anarchist removal of all government. Rather they were explicitly advocating the replacement of a tyrant with a just ruler where this was possible.
Al-Ghazzali on confronting tyrants
A final example may be taken from the writing of Imam al-Ghazzali, an exceptionally influential scholar in the Islamic tradition who Shaykh Hamza particularly admires. On al-Ghazzali, who is generally opposed to rebellion but not other forms of opposition to tyranny, I would like to once again cite the historian Michael Cook. In his previously cited work, after an extensive discussion of al-Ghazzali’s articulation of the doctrine of commanding right and forbidding wrong, Cook concludes (p. 456):
As we have seen, his views on this subject are marked by a certain flirtation with radicalism. In this Ghazzālī may have owed something to his teacher Juwaynī, and he may also have been reacting to the Ḥanafī chauvinism of the Seljūq rulers of his day. The duty, of course, extends to everyone, not just rulers and scholars. More remarkably, he is prepared to allow individual subjects to have recourse to weapons where necessary, and even to sanction the formation of armed bands to implement the duty without the permission of the ruler. And while there is no question of countenancing rebellion, Ghazzālī is no accommodationist: he displays great enthusiasm for men who take their lives in their hands and rebuke unjust rulers in harsh and uncompromising language.
Most of the material Cook bases his discussion upon is taken from al-Ghazzali’s magnum opus, The Revival of the Religious Sciences. Such works once again demonstrate that the Islamic tradition, or great Sufi masters and their masterworks, cannot be the basis for the supportive attitude towards tyrannical rule on the part of a minority of modern scholars.
Modern discontinuities and their high stakes
But modern times give rise to certain changes that also merit our attention. In modern times, new technologies of governance, such as democracy, have gone some way to dealing with challenges such as the management of the transition of power without social breakdown and the loss of life, as well as other forms of accountability that are not possible in absolute autocracies. For their part, absolute autocracies have had their tyrannical dimensions amplified with Orwellian technologies that invade private spaces and facilitate barbaric forms of torture and inhumane degradation on a scale that was likely unimaginable to premodern scholars. The stakes of a scholar’s decision of whether to support autocracy or democracy could not be higher.
Modern scholars like Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi (b. 1345/1926), someone who Shaykh Hamza’s own mentor, Shaykh Abdullah b. Bayyah (b. 1353f./1935) considered a teacher until fairly recently, has advocated for an Islamic conception of democracy as a possible means to deal with the problem of tyranny that plagues much of the Muslim world. He is hardly the only scholar to do so. And in contrast with some of the scholars of the past who advocated armed rebellion in response to tyranny, most contemporary scholars supporting the Arab revolutions have argued for peaceful political change wherever possible. They have advocated for peaceful protest in opposition to tyranny. Where this devolved into violence in places like Libya, Syria, and Yemen, this was generally because of the disproportionately violent responses of regimes to peaceful protests.
Shaykh Hamza on the nature of government
For Shaykh Hamza, the fault here appears to lie with the peaceful protestors for provoking these governments to crush them. Such a conception of the dynamics of protest appears to assume that the autocratic governmental response to this is a natural law akin to cause and effect. The logic would seem to be: if one peacefully calls for reform and one is murdered in cold blood by a tyrannical government, then one has only oneself to blame. Governments, according to this viewpoint, have no choice but to be murderous and tyrannical. But in an age in which nearly half of the world’s governments are democracies, however flawed at times, why not aspire to greater accountability and less violent forms of governance than outright military dictatorship?
Rather than ask this question, Shaykh Hamza Yusuf appears to be willing to defend autocracy no matter what they do on the grounds that government, in principle, is what is at stake. Indeed, in defending government as necessary and a blessing, he rhetorically challenges his critics to “ask the people of Libya whether government is a blessing; ask the people of Yemen whether government is a blessing; ask the people of Syria whether government is a blessing?” The tragic irony of such statements is that these countries have, in part, been destroyed because of the interventions of a government, one for which Shaykh Hamza serves as an official, namely the UAE. This government has one of the most aggressive foreign policies in the region and has been instrumental in the failure of representative governments and the survival of tyrannical regimes throughout the Middle East.
Where do we go from here?
In summary, Shaykh Hamza’s critics are not concerned that he is “supporting governments,” rather they are concerned that for the last few years, he has found himself supporting bad government and effectively opposing the potential for good government in a region that is desperately in need of it. And while he may view himself as, in fact, supporting stability in the region by supporting the UAE, such a view is difficult if not impossible to reconcile with the evidence. Given his working relationship with the UAE government, perhaps Shaykh Hamza could use his position to remind the UAE of the blessing of government in an effort to stop them from destroying the governments in the region through proxy wars that result in death on an epic scale. If he is unable to do this, then the most honourable thing to do under such circumstances would be to withdraw from such political affiliations and use all of his influence and abilities to call for genuine accountability in the region in the same way that he is currently using his influence and abilities to provide cover, even if unwittingly, for the UAE’s oppression.
And Allah knows best.
Raising A Child Between Ages 2-7 | Dr Hatem Al Haj
This is called a pre-operational period by Jean Piaget who was focused on cognitive development.
Children this age have difficulty reconciling between different dimensions or seemingly contradictory concepts. One dimension will dominate and the other will be ignored. This applies in the physical and abstract realms. For example, the water in the longer cup must be more than that in the shorter one, no matter how wide each cup is. Length dominates over width in his/her mind.
Throughout most of this stage, a child’s thinking is self-centered (egocentric). This is why preschool children have a problem with sharing.
In this stage, language develops very quickly, and by two years of age, kids should be combining words, and by three years, they should be speaking in sentences.
Erik Erikson, who looked at development from a social perspective, felt that the child finishes the period of autonomy vs. shame by 3 years of age and moves on to the period of initiative vs. guilt which will dominate the psycho-social development until age 6. In this period, children assert themselves as leaders and initiative takers. They plan and initiate activities with others. If encouraged, they will become leaders and initiative takers.
Based on the above, here are some recommendations:
In this stage, faith would be more caught than taught and felt than understood. The serene, compassionate home environment and the warm and welcoming masjid environment are vital.
Recognition through association: The best way of raising your kid’s love of Allah and His Messenger is by association. If you buy him ice cream, take the opportunity to tell them it is Allah who provided for you; the same applies to seeing a beautiful rose that s/he likes, tell them it is Allah who made it. Tell them stories about Prophet Muhammad . Statements like: “Prophet Muhammad was kinder to kids than all of us”; “Prophet Muhammad was kind to animals”; ” Prophet Muhammad loved sweets”; ” Prophet Muhammad helped the weak and old,” etc. will increase your child’s love for our most beloved .
Faith through affiliation: The child will think, “This is what WE do, and how WE pray, and where WE go for worship.” In other words, it is a time of connecting with a religious fraternity, which is why the more positive the child’s interactions with that fraternity are, the more attached to it and its faith he/she will become.
Teach these 2-7 kids in simple terms. You may be able to firmly insert in them non-controversial concepts of right and wrong (categorical imperatives) in simple one-dimensional language. Smoking is ḥarâm. No opinions. NO NUANCES. No “even though.” They ate not ready yet for “in them is great sin and [yet, some] benefit for people.”
Promote their language development by speaking to them a lot and reading them books, particularly such books that provoke curiosity and open discussions to enhance their expressive language. Encourage them to be bilingual as learning two languages at once does not harm a child’s cognitive abilities, rather it enhances them.
This is despite an initial stage of confusion and mixing that will resolve by 24 to 30 months of age. By 36 months of age, they will be fluent bilingual speakers. Introduce Islamic vocabulary, such as Allah, Muhammad , masjid, Muslim, brothers, salaat, in-sha’a-Allah, al-Hamdulillah, subhana-Allah, etc. (Don’t underestimate the effect of language; it does a lot more than simply denoting and identifying things.)
In this pre-operational period, their ability of understanding problem solving and analysis is limited. They can memorize though. However, the focus on memorization should still be moderate. The better age for finishing the memorization of the Quran is 10-15.
Use illustrated books and field trips.
Encourage creativity and initiative-taking but set reasonable limits for their safety. They should also realize that their freedom is not without limits.
Between 3-6 years, kids have a focus on their private parts, according to Freud. Don’t get frustrated; tell them gently it is not appropriate to touch them in public.
Don’t get frustrated with their selfishness; help them gently to overcome this tendency, which is part of this stage.
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